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ABSTRACT 
To what extent do transnational companies (TNCs) have the capacity to influence 
public policy? This article uses the results of a major new study of TNC 
ownership to shed light on this issue. It is found that TNC ownership and control 
is extremely concentrated and that there is an inner core of TNCs with strong co-
ownership links that is overrepresented in the membership of major business 
organisations. It is concluded that these factors enhance the potential for TNCs in 
general, and core TNCs in particular, to influence public policy.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
In democracies the decisions of governments are supposed to be determined by 
citizens through elections in which parties run on sets of policy promises that they 
then implement if elected to office. In reality this is a partial picture at best. 
Voters are not the only influence on governments. One of the most significant 
other sources of influence, if not the most significant, is business. Because their 
own fortunes are affected by government decisions at every turn, firms are 
constantly trying to nudge public policy in a more business-friendly direction. 
While pluralists see business as just one group among others, elitists maintain that 
business is more powerful than any other group. Lindblom argues that business 
has a privileged position because governments are held responsible for the 
economy and a healthy economy requires business investment that cannot be 
compelled but must be attracted by inducements. For Marxists the issue is often 
whether the state has any autonomy from business at all.1 
If we take the view that business power is something to be established 
empirically, one factor to consider is the degree of business unity. The extent to 
which business is united, if at all, is one of the main issues dividing pluralists 
from elitists, but both assume that unity does or would enable business to exert 
more influence on public policy. Dahl, for example, makes the logical point that 
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an elite cannot rule if it is divided on what it wants.2 Dreiling and Darves argue 
WKDWµZKHQXQLILHGWKHUHVRXUFHVRIFRUSRUDWLRQVVLPSO\FURZGRXWWKHUHVRXUFHV
of all other societal interests.¶3 Issues on which business is united can be taken up 
by representative organisations that cannot afford to push policies opposed by any 
significant part of their membership. Where firms are united they are likely to 
react similarly to what governments do even without conscious coordination, 
thereby giving bigger rewards to governments that do what they want and 
inflicting more severe punishments on WKRVH WKDW GRQ¶W Although Smith argues 
that business in the United States is not very influential on issues on which it is 
united because these issues are also ideological, partisan, and salient to voters and 
the media,4 he is not arguing that unity as such is unimportant or 
counterproductive: unless business unity causes issues to become more 
ideological, partisan or salient, business united is still likely to do better than 
business divided. 
A key factor here is the extent to which business ownership is concentrated. 
In such cases fewer firms need to agree on aims and tactics for an effective 
consensus to be formed. Among other things this makes it easier for firms to agree 
on action by their representative organisations. Dominant firms in industries with 
concentrated ownership have stronger incentives to take political action because 
their share of any consequent economic gains would be bigger than for equivalent 
firms in less concentrated industries. Such firms may also be in a position to 
discourage other firms from free-riding on such actions.5 Although the empirical 
evidence in this area does not speak directly to this question, American studies 
have found that concentration is one of a number of factors linked to corporate 
political action.6 In the late 1980s, for example, similar political behaviour by 
members of an industry, in this instance contributions to Political Action 
&RPPLWWHHVZDVOLQNHGWRµFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIFRPPRQVWRFNRZQHUVKLSRIILUPVLQ
DQLQGXVWU\DQGFRPPRQPHPEHUVKLSVRQWKHERDUGVRIILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶7 
How concentrated is business ownership? This breaks down into two 
questions. What proportions of individual firms have controlling shareholders? 
And to what extent is control of firms in general concentrated in the hands of a 
few big shareholders?  
Inferring control from ownership is not simple. Even 50 percent of voting 
shares is not enough if regulations stipulate super-majorities for important 
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decisions, for example. And substantial minority shareholdings can bring control 
where there are no other significant shareholdings. Some studies employ 
thresholds as low as 10 percent of voting shares.  
Empirical investigations into the ultimate ownership of corporations using a 
20 percent threshold find a mixed picture: dispersed control in Britain, Ireland, the 
United States and Japan but family control in other West European countries and 
in East Asian countries.8 In addition, the percentage of corporate assets owned by 
the top 15 families was lower in Britain and Japan than in other European and 
East Asian countries.9 The message of these studies is that considerable 
concentration of corporate ownership and control is the norm in industrialised 
countries. Britain, Ireland, the United States and Japan are exceptions ± 
significant exceptions, to be sure, but if we take firms country by country they are 
exceptions nevertheless.  
But what about firms that transcend national borders: transnational 
corporations (TNCs)? Are TNCs united enough for this to make a difference to 
their influence on public policy? What exactly is the structure of ownership and 
control among TNCs? Until recently, lack of reliable data made it impossible to 
study this in any systematic quantitative manner. But good data is now available, 
and a pathbreaking study by systems analysts in Zurich has used this to analyse 
patterns of ownership and control among TNCs.10  
This aim of this article is to use the results of this study to test the 
proposition that the capacity of TNCs to influence public policy is greater than 
previously thought because TNC ownership and control is not only extremely 
concentrated but also extremely centralised. This is an issue on which good 
information has not been available until now. The first section states the 
theoretical argument as to why it is reasonable to expect that high levels of 
business concentration and centralisation strengthen the capacity of firms to 
influence public policy. The second sets out and evaluates the new data in order to 
evaluate the extent to which it supports the hypothesis that TNC ownership and 
control is in fact very concentrated and centralised. The third tests a hypothesis 
based on the idea that there is an elite core of TNCs that dominates relevant 
business organisations, namely that these core TNCs are overrepresented in the 
membership of representative business organisations. The final section discusses 
the results and draws conclusions. 
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CONCENTRATION, CENTRALISATION AND INFLUENCE 
What reasons are there to expect that concentration and centralisation of TNC 
ownership and control add to the capacity of TNCs to influence public policy? 
Concentration 
Numerous authors argue that economic concentration increases the political 
SRZHURIEXVLQHVVE\LQFUHDVLQJWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUSROLWLFDOFRKHVLRQµRWKHUWKLQJV
being equal, the smaller number of actors in a given situation the easier it is to 
HVWDEOLVKDFRQVHQVXV¶11 This may not be true in all cases, but it would be difficult 
to deny that, in general, concentration makes it easier for firms to reach agreement 
on political action, that is, facilitates action that is supported by a broad range of 
firms and not opposed by any significant proportion of firms. In doing so it would 
also make it easier for representative organisations to get involved in lobbying. It 
is also argued that concentration facilitates action by making it easier to develop a 
common culture and organisation among those in charge.12 The assumption 
behind all these arguments is that taking political action brings more influence 
over public policy than not taking political action.  
A further argument is that concentration increases the likelihood of political 
action because the largest firms in a concentrated industry stand to receive a 
bigger share of any economic benefits of political action because, other things 
being equal, their share of industry sales, revenue and profits is bigger than it 
would be if the industry were not so concentrated. For this reason their cost-
benefit analyses of prospective political action are likely to be more positive 
towards political action than if the industry was less concentrated. It is also 
thought that such firms are better able to spread the costs of taking action by 
discouraging smaller firms from free-riding: collecting the benefits of political 
action without contributing to it. And it is argued that firms in concentrated 
industries are more likely to gain access to policy makers because policy makers 
are more receptive to lobbying groups that are representative of their 
constituents.13  
Although these arguments have mainly been applied to concentration based 
on firm size and measured by indicators such as sales or market capitalisation, 
they also apply to concentration of TNC ownership and control measured in terms 
of shareholdings. This includes the argument that concentration makes it easier to 
agree on political action because fewer firms need to agree for an effective 
consensus to be formed, with the proviso that the major stockholding TNCs are 
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both able and willing to make the TNCs in which they have shareholdings accept 
any agreements reached on political action and contribute where appropriate to 
that action. In other words it presupposes not only that ownership translates into 
possession of the means of control, understood as µWKH SRZHU WR GHWHUPLQH WKH
fundamental elements in corporate behaviour, centred on the power to determine 
WKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHUXOLQJERG\RIFRUSRUDWHOHDGHUV¶,14 but also that possession 
of the means of control translates into active control: using these levers to 
influence what the controlled TNCs do.  
The assumption that ownership gives one possession of the means of control 
is obviously valid where majority shareholdings are concerned. It is also valid 
where a TNC (or coalition of TNCs) owns a substantial minority of shares and all 
other shareholders are small and unaligned. A striking illustration of this dynamic 
is the finding that in a company with a thousand voting shares as few as six 
percent of shares will place the owner on the winning side of shareholder votes 96 
percent of the time if all other shareholders are small and indifferent. Under such 
conditions shareholdings of as little as 10 percent can give effective control.15 The 
assumption that ownership brings control is also valid where groups of TNCs 
jointly own a controlling shareholding even when they are not cooperating in a 
coalition insofar as they are likely to act in parallel if whatever broad interests 
they share are threatened ± that is, insofar as they are likely to act as if they were 
in coalition. Taking into account both coalitions and constellations of interest16 
significantly increases the number of TNCs defined as having controlling 
shareholders.  
The literature divides the mechanisms that controlling shareholders can use 
to exert influence into two main types. Firms based in continental European 
countries and Japan tend to intervene directly through means such as appointing 
directors to boards, voting at shareholder meetings, and making implicit or 
explicit threats to use these devices. Firms in English-speaking countries tend to 
exert influence through implicit or explicit threats to increase the risk of a hostile 
takeover RIWKHRZQHGILUPWKURXJKPDNLQJWKDWILUP¶VVKDUHVFKHDSHUE\VHOOLQJ
their shareholdings.17 This threat is especially potent in the area of corporate 
governance because institutional investors often use indices of corporate 
JRYHUQDQFHE\UDWLQJVDJHQFLHVVXFKDV0RRG\¶VWRGHFLGHZKich shares to buy,18 
as this means that they are likely to respond en bloc to perceived shortcomings in 
DILUP¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHOn the other hand, the efficacy of this strategy for 
                                           
14
 Scott 1997, 36. 
15
 Florence 1953, 195; Scott 1997, 44. 
16
 Scott 1997, 48-50. 
17
 Noteboom 1999, 846. 
18
 Lysandrou and Stoyanova, 1074-1076. 
6 
 
investors is limited by the fact that selling large amounts of stock depresses the 
price these investors get for it, a consideration that in many cases may prompt 
them to opt for direct intervention instead. 19 
While some owners prefer a hands-off approach, and indeed may not even 
see themselves as owners,20 it is clear that controlling shareholders can and do use 
devices such as these to influence the firms they control. A study of the machine 
tool industry in Switzerland, for example, found that institutional investors can 
and will replace CEOs and directors, use their majority shareholdings to win votes 
against the management position, and take over firms entirely. Other studies find 
evidence that institutional investors have influenced both corporate investment 
decisions and the nature of corporate governance in the firms they control.21 
Nevertheless it is clear that investors do not always exercise the control to 
which their shareholdings entitle them. In such cases the argument that 
concentration facilitates united business action does not apply because the 
µFRQWUROOHG¶ ILUP PD\ fail to cooperate: concentration of ownership and control 
facilitates united business action only when it is active control that is 
concentrated. 
Centralisation 
Centralisation facilitates united business action by creating a tendency for TNC 
attitudes towards public policy to become more similar. 
An industry is centralised in this context to the extent that the biggest firms 
are connected by a dense web of controlling cross-shareholdings. The point here 
is that where A and B have controlling shareholdings in each other, and are 
willing to use these to exert control over each other ± active control - the result is 
that the actions of each, including actions designed to influence public policy, are 
constrained by the preferences of the other and thereby become more similar.  
This argument also applies where A is part of a coalition of TNCs that has a 
controlling shareholding in B at the same time as B is part of a coalition that has a 
controlling shareholding in A: to the extent that the preferences of coalition 
members are the same, as they must be some extent because otherwise they would 
not be in coalition, and the coalition is willing to act accordingly, these shared 
preferences will constrain the actions of the controlled firm where the two come 
into conflict. Where each coalition is united on its orientation towards public 
policy, with the coalition of which A is a member pressing its preferences on B 
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while the coalition of which B is a member presses its preferences on A, the likely 
result is that what A and B do to try to influence public policy become more 
similar. 
And it applies where A is part of a constellation of interests consisting of 
TNCs that has a controlling shareholding in B at the same time as B is part of a 
constellation of interests that has a controlling shareholding in A: to the extent 
that the interests of members of the constellation are the same, which to some 
extent they must be if it is a constellation of interest, and these interests are 
sufficiently important for members to act in parallel if they are threatened, these 
shared interests will constrain the actions of the controlled firm where the two 
come into conflict. Where these shared interests relate to public policy, once again 
the result will be convergence: the actions of B in relation to public policy will 
become more similar to those of the constellation of which A is a part while the 
actions of A will become more similar to those of the constellation of which B is a 
part. 
Controlling shareholders do not directly alter what controlled firms do to try 
to influence public policy. Instead they constrain their actions by means of 
explicit or implicit messages that change the attitudes of the managements of 
controlled firms to public policy and what can be done about it, for example by 
changing the perceived cost-benefit ratio of different possible courses of action. 
Attitudes are ways of thinking or feeling about something, in this case public 
policy, that can be expressed in forms such as statements, decisions, strategies, 
messages and actions.  
In the case of influence based on direct interactions, changes in attitude are 
expressed in changes in what the controlled firms do to try to influence public 
policy. Where larger numbers of TNCs, coalitions of TNCs and constellations of 
interest are involved, so that interactions are often mediated by two or more links 
composed of controlling shareholdings, actions will be constrained by changing 
the attitudes of a succession of downstream TNCs: a billiard ball effect.  
Where a group of TNCs, coalitions and/or constellations of interest are all 
connected both ways, directly or indirectly, by controlling shareholdings used to 
exert active control, the attitude of each TNC will be constrained by the attitudes 
of all the others. The result is likely to be that the attitudes and actions relating to 
public policy of the TNCs in the group will tend, over time and via mutual 
constraint, to become more similar.  
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TNC ownership and control is centralised to the extent that one of these 
networks of controlling shareholdings is much bigger than the others and includes 
among its members many if not most of the largest owners. In such cases the 
attitudes to public policy of these core TNCs, and of the TNCs they control 
through one-way controlling shareholdings, are likely to be more similar than 
would otherwise be the case.  
Concentration, centralisation and public policy 
We have seen that a high degree of concentration of active control makes it easier 
for TNCs to agree on political action while a high degree of centralisation is likely 
to lead to greater unity among TNCs in their attitudes to public policy. The result 
must be an enhanced capacity to influence public policy.  
First, the resources provided by firms for lobbying will be combined behind 
unambiguous messages rather than being split between different campaigns. 
Better resourced and more single-minded lobbying with less opposition should be 
more successful lobbying. 
Second, relevant representative organisations are more likely to become 
involved where firms are more united. In the case of TNCs these would include 
organisations such as the Business Roundtable and Financial Services Roundtable 
in the United States, and the European Roundtable and European Financial 
Services Roundtable in Europe. This is because the actions of representative 
organisations must reflect a broad consensus among their members if they are not 
to antagonise and lose members.22  
Third, we would expect TNCs to be more likely to react similarly to what 
national governments do. One consequence of this is likely to be a greater 
tendency to shift investment in the same direction at the same time in response to 
policy developments. This would mean bigger investment flows in response to the 
actions of governments and therefore bigger rewards for governments that do 
ZKDW71&VZDQWDQGPRUHVHYHUHVDQFWLRQVIRUWKRVHWKDWGRQ¶W 
There are good reasons for believing that concentration and centralisation of 
TNCs would increase their capacity to influence public policy, other things being 
equal, provided that it is active control that is concentrated and centralised, not 
just ownership or possession of the means of control. The question now is to 
ascertain the extent to which the new data on TNC ownership and control support 
the proposition that active control of TNCs is in fact very concentrated and 
centralised. 
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THE NETWORK OF GLOBAL CORPORATE CONTROL 
A new discovery 
The data to be used is drawn from a recent quantitative study of TNC ownership 
by Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston.23 7KLV LV SDUW RI D JHQHUDWLRQ RI µELJ GDWD¶
studies that are extending the reach of researchers in a wide range of fields. 
At first glance it seems clear that the findings of Vitali, Glattfelder and 
Battiston strongly support the hypothesis that high levels of concentration and 
centralisation have enhanced the capacity of TNCs to influence public policy, as 
they indicate that in 2007 80 percent of total global TNC operating revenue was 
notionally controlled by just 737 shareholders, of which 298 were TNCs, and that 
nearly 40 percent of TNC operating revenue was controlled by an interconnected 
core of 295 TNCs, just 0.7 percent of all the TNCs included in the study. 
But is this really the case? To make an informed judgement it is necessary 
to understand how the study was carried out. 
7KH DXWKRUV¶ ILUVW PRYH was to pick out the 43,060 TNCs from the 30 
million firms on the commercial ORBIS database, TNCs being defined as firms 
which hold at least 10 percent of the shares of a firm located in another country, 
and trace the patterns of their shareholdings in order to put together a map of all 
the ownership pathways originating from and pointing to TNCs. This revealed 
that a small interconnected group of mainly American and European TNCs owns 
a disproportionate share of TNCs in general.24 The authors use the image of a bow 
tie to organise our understanding of the broad pattern of these ownership relations.  
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Figure 1. The bow-tie topology of ownership and control 
 
  Source: Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston 2011, 4 
 
This reveals the following:25 
x The knot of the bow tie, or strongly connected component (SCC), is defined 
as the CORE and consists of 295 TNCs connected by a network of cross-
shareholdings so dense that three quarters of the shares of these CORE firms 
are owned by other CORE firms. Together the operating revenue of this 
group of firms constitutes 19 percent of the total operating revenue of all 
TNCs put together; 
x The right-hand OUT section of the bow tie consists of firms that are owned at 
least in part by CORE firms but do not themselves have shares in CORE 
firms. The 6,488 TNCs here account for just under 60 percent of total global 
TNC operating revenue; 
x The left-hand IN section consists of 282 TNCs that own shares in CORE 
firms but in which CORE firms themselves do not own shares. These account 
for just 2 percent of total global TNC operating revenue; 
x The semi-detached tube and tendril (T&T) extensions to the bow tie consist 
of 8,246 TNCs that can be said to be connected to the CORE by ownership 
pathways only if you ignore the direction of ownership: if you follow an 
ownership pathway between the CORE and these TNCs you find a point at 
which the firm indirectly owned by one or more CORE firms does not own 
shares in the next firm but instead is part-owned by this firm. T&T firms 
account for 14 percent of global TNC operating revenue; 
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x The 27,569 TNCs that are not connected to the core at all account for just 6 
percent of global TNC operating revenue.  
So we have a core (the CORE) of just under 300 interconnected TNCs that 
have ownership stakes in about 6,000 other TNCs. Together these CORE and 
OUT TNCs account for nearly 80 percent of the operating revenue generated by 
TNCs worldwide.  
But to what extent do these ownership links represent real control? The 
authors tackle this question by applying three distinct models for inferring control 
from ownership. Their preferred threshold model makes the reasonable 
assumption that ownership of over 50 percent of a firm¶Vvoting shares generally 
brings 100 percent control. In such cases other shareholders are deemed to have 
zero control. Where there are no majority shareholders, the percentage of control 
is deemed to be the same as the percentage of voting shares owned.26  
This threshold model is applied as follows: 27 
1. Identify the percentage of voting shares represented by each ownership link; 
2. Use the threshold model to derive a figure for the percentage of control 
represented by each link; 
3. Calculate the percentage of control held by each shareholder (TNC or non-
TNC) in each TNC over which it has some measure of control (downstream 
TNC) by multiplying the figures for percent control of all the links 
connecting them (if A controls 40 per cent of B while B controls 40 per cent 
of C, for example, it follows that A controls 16 per cent of C); 
4. Obtain a measure of the economic value controlled by each shareholder by 
multiplying the figures for percentage control by the operating revenue of 
each downstream TNC, adding these figures together, and expressing the 
result as a percentage of the total operating revenue of all TNCs in the study. 
Applying this procedure reveals that, XVLQJ WKH DXWKRUV¶ GHILQLWLRQ RI
control, TNCs are extremely concentrated: 80 percent of the operating revenue of 
TNCs worldwide is controlled by just 737 shareholders, of whom 298 are TNCs. 
These topholders are mostly from the CORE and IN parts of the bow tie. Most of 
the biggest topholders are either American or British, and most of the rest are 
European. Over three quarters of the topholders are in financial services.  
The results also indicate that TNCs are very centralised: 39 per cent of total 
global TNC operating revenue is controlled by a group of 295 TNCs connected by 
a network of cross-shareholdings so dense that three quarters of the shares of 
these CORE firms are owned by other CORE firms. 
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The ten topholders with the largest individual shares of control, all of which 
are in financial services, jointly control nearly 20 percent of global TNC operating 
revenue. Seven of these are CORE firms. The biggest, Barclays, was found to 
control four percent of global TNC operating revenue all by itself: 28  
1. Barclays (CORE, UK) 
2. The Capital Group Companies (IN, US) 
3. Fidelity Investments (IN, US) 
4. AXA (CORE, France) 
5. State Street Corporation (CORE, US) 
6. JP Morgan Chase (CORE, US) 
7. Legal and General Group (CORE, UK) 
8. Vanguard Group (IN, US) 
9. UBS (CORE, Switzerland) 
10. Merrill Lynch (CORE, US) 
To sum up, the results indicate that in 2007 control of TNCs worldwide was 
extremely concentrated and centralised. ,W LV WKLVSDWWHUQ WKDW WKHVWXG\¶VDXWKRUV
refer to as the network of global corporate control. But to what extent is it 
controlling shareholdings that are being measured? And to what extent do the 
figures for concentration and centralisation refer to active control? 
Controlling shareholdings 
The argument that concentration and centralisation enhance the capacity of TNCs 
to influence public policy depends on TNCs being able to exert control over other 
TNCs due to their possession of controlling shareholdings. It is therefore essential 
that the figures for concentration and centralisation are based on links that consist 
of controlling shareholdings. But this is not always the case. 
For a start, the data does not include all TNCs. Neither does it include all 
the shareholdings of the TNCs that are included. The ORBIS database is the best 
source of information we have for this sort of analysis, as it gathers together and 
organises publicly available information from company annual reports, 
correspondence with companies, filings with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, stock exchange records, national-level providers of financial 
information from annual accounts filed with official registers, company websites, 
phone calls to companies, and press news. By 2007, when the study was carried 
out, it covered over 30 million firms.29 It includes more TNCs than any other 
database and its ownership figures are verified by checking them across different 
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sources.30 But the number of companies for which Bureau van Dijk has ownership 
data is much smaller than the total number of firms in the ORBIS database, and 
ORBIS itself is not universal in its coverage. In 2011 there were 20 million 
companies in the ownership database compared with 75 million in ORBIS. There 
is also an issue of missing values, as Bureau van Dijk does not claim to have 
collected all the ownership links of all firms in the ownership database.31  
Having said this, the size and extensive ownership links of large TNCs 
means that they show up in many records all around the world and are unlikely to 
be left out. It is relatively small TNCs that may be overlooked. For this reason the 
lack of comprehensive coverage of TNCs is unlikely to affect the results much.  
Omitting some of the shareholdings of TNCs included in the study is 
unlikely to make a significant difference either, as in general it would only mean a 
few extra shares here and there. Only in some cases would omitting some of a 
71&¶V VKDUHKROGLQJV push another 71&¶V VKDUHKROGLQJV DERYH WKH  SHU FHQW
mark, which would mean that the figure for control for that TNC would more than 
double from below 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Alternatively, omitting some of a 
71&¶V VKDUHKROGLQJV FRXOG SXOO LWV WRWDO shareholdings below the 50 per cent 
mark, thereby halving its apparent control.  
The second source of error is the possible inclusion of some non-voting 
shares when it is only voting shares that are relevant to the exercise of control. 
Although the share data is supposed to indicate percentages of voting shares only, 
WKHGDWDEDVHGRFXPHQWDWLRQVWDWHVWKDWµZKHQWKHUHDUHFDWHJRULHVRIVKDUHVVSOLW
into Voting/Non voting shares, the percentages that are recorded are those 
attached to the category Voting shares¶.32 This means that where a source does not 
distinguish between voting and non-voting shares, the ORBIS figures may in 
some instances count non-voting shares as voting shares. To the extent that this 
occurs, it could lead to inferring control where none exists, in cases where some 
of the shares held by the supposedly controlling firm are non-voting shares, or to 
missing relations of control that do exist, where real majority shareholdings are 
pushed into apparent minority positions by other shareholdings inflated by non-
voting shares.  
The question is how widespread these errors are likely to be. In the absence 
of data from Bureau van Dijk concerning which sources do not make the 
voting/non-voting distinction, we have to make an estimate based on studies of 
firms at national level. The latest available figures, from the late 1990s, tell us that 
the problem is restricted mainly to just a few countries. Firms did not issue 
                                           
30
 Pinto Ribeiro, Menghinello and Backer 2010, 12-13. 
31
 Bureau van Dijk 2012. 
32
 Bureau van Dijk 2008, 1, 6. 
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multiple class shares at all in Belgium or the Netherlands in Europe; in China, 
India, Japan, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Saudi 
Arabia or Singapore in Asia; or in Argentina; and they are rare in Australia, Chile, 
France, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey and the 
United States. The proportion of firms issuing them was higher in Austria (23 
percent), Britain (24 percent), Ireland (28 percent), Germany (18 percent) and 
Norway (13 percent). But only in some countries was this practice widespread: 
Sweden (66 percent of firms), Switzerland (51 percent), Italy (41 percent) and 
Finland (38 percent). It was also frequent in Denmark, Canada, Brazil, Korea and 
South Africa.33 Furthermore, counting non-voting shares as voting shares will not 
always lead to erroneous attributions or denials of control. For these reasons I 
conclude that the existence of this type of error does not invalidate the overall 
findings. 
Third, the models for inferring control from ownership all lead the authors 
to over-estimate the incidence of controlling shareholdings. This is because all 
three ascribe some measure of control to shareholdings that are very small. Their 
preferred threshold model equates percentage control with percentage ownership 
where there is no majority shareholder even where these shareholdings are very 
small. But a shareholding of, say, one per cent does not give a shareholder any 
control. This means that not all of the shareholdings counted as controlling 
shareholdings are in fact controlling shareholdings. These models thereby impart 
an upwards bias to the figures for concentration and control. 
Somewhat surprisingly this upwards bias is at least partly offset by the fact 
that the study takes no account of the fact that TNCs with small shareholdings can 
form coalitions or, where they have similar interests but are less organised, 
constellations of interests, both of which can as units have controlling 
shareholdings in other TNCs. This means that many of the small shareholdings 
that alone would bring no control form part of controlling shareholdings. In such 
cases small shareholdings should also be counted as controlling shareholdings 
because they do enable their owners ± as part of a coalition or constellation of 
interests ± to exert control over the owned firm.  
This means that use of the threshold model does not overstate the incidence 
of controlling shareholdings as much as it first appears to. While omitting all non-
controlling shareholdings held by individual TNCs could leave a core that is much 
smaller, or even two or more cores not connected by reciprocal controlling 
shareholdings, adding the controlling shareholdings of coalitions and 
constellations of interests would bring back many of these small shareholdings. 
                                           
33
 Percentage figures from Faccio and Lang 2002, 386 and Gadhoum, Lang and Young 2005, 348; 
otherwise Nenova 2003, 327-328. 
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Unless there are in fact very few coalitions and constellations of interests, which 
seems unlikely, the ultimate result may well be, as the study finds, a single core. 
Active control 
The other condition for concentration and centralisation to influence public 
policy, as we saw earlier, is that TNCs with controlling shareholdings use them to 
influence the firms they own. It is active control that matters, not just possession 
of the means of control. 
Here the sWXG\¶Vresults give us no guidance because the data on which they 
are based contain no information on the extent to which owners use, or are 
prepared to use, the control levers at their disposal. We therefore have to fall back 
onto what we already know: TNCs, coalitions of TNCs and constellations of 
interests often do exert influence through using or threatening to use the voting 
power they possess by virtue of their holdings, but they do not always choose to 
exercise these powers. Investors based in English-speaking countries in particular 
often prefer a hands-off attitude.  
%XWWKLVGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\PHDQWKDWQRFRQWUROLVH[HUFLVHGLIILUPVZLVK
to keep their share price buoyant, for example because they fear a hostile takeover 
if the price plummets, they have to take seriously threats by large shareholders to 
VHOOWKHLUVKDUHVLIWKHILUPGRHVQ¶WGRZKDWWKHVKDUHKROGHUZDQWVLWWRGR,QPDQ\
cases they will respond by falling into line. This is not control in quite the same 
sense as using your voting power, since in the case of threatened share sales it is 
open to the firm not to cooperate whereas shareholder votes have legal force, but 
to the extent to which firms do yield the result is the same: influence is exerted 
and the firm does things differently.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that at least some investors choose not to exercise 
either of these options: they remain passive, and the firms in which they have 
controlling shareholdings remain autonomous. What this means is that active 
control is not as extensive as control measured in terms of possession of 
controlling shareholdings. It follows that the VWXG\¶Vfigures for concentration and 
centralisation of control are higher than they would be if they measured active 
control. 
The results stand 
CORVH DQDO\VLV RI WKH VWXG\¶V UHVXOWV has revealed that concentration and 
centralisation of active control of TNCs based on possession of controlling 
shareholdings is in fact lower than the results indicate. However there is no reason 
to believe that it is much lower. It seems unlikely that the lack of comprehensive 
coverage of TNCs and their shareholdings affects the results much. Some non-
voting shares may be included as voting shares, but this is only a problem ± if 
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indeed it is a problem ± for shareholdings in firms based in just a few countries. 
The inclusion of small shareholdings as if they give some control means that the 
figures for concentration and centralisation are overstated, as does failing to take 
into account the fact that at least some shareholding TNCs are passive owners, but 
this effect is balanced WRVRPHH[WHQWE\ WKHVWXG\¶V IDLOXUH WR WDNH LQWRDFFRXQW
control exerted by small shareholders via coalitions of TNCs and constellations of 
interests. It is also reasonable to assume that the degree of concentration and 
centralisation of active control is correlated with the degree of concentration and 
centralisation of the means of control. It follows that active control today is more 
concentrated and centralised than if the means of control were not so concentrated 
and centralised.  
We cannot exclude the possibility that these sources of error lead to the 
calculation of figures that are grossly misleading. However the more obvious 
conclusion is that the figures for concentration and centralisation are biased 
XSZDUGV EXW QRW VR PXFK WKDW WKH\ LQYDOLGDWH WKH VWXG\¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW 71&
concentration and centralisation is very high. The main risk is that correcting all 
these errors could reveal more than one core. 
The appropriate conclusion to draw is that while TNC concentration and 
centralisation is not as high as the study indicates, it is nevertheless still very high. 
For this reason the argument that concentration and centralisation increases 
the capacity of firms to influence public policy can be applied to TNCs. TNCs are 
concentrated and centralised in the relevant sense of active control. Concentration 
means that it is easier to agree on united political action. Centralisation means that 
the attitudes to public policy of CORE TNCs and the TNCs they control are more 
similar than they would otherwise be. Consequently these TNCs, and by extension 
TNCs as a whole, are more united, and this enhances their capacity to influence 
public policy because TNC lobbying is more single-minded and better-resourced, 
representative organisations are more likely to get involved, and TNCs are more 
likely to react similarly to what governments do, which means bigger rewards for 
governments that do what they want and more severe sanctions for those that 
GRQ¶W 
 
CENTRALISATION AND THE CAPACITY FOR BUSINESS UNITY 
The study by Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston has established that TNC ownership 
and control is very concentrated and centralised. In particular it has established 
that there is a single core of interconnected TNCs: one of the networks of TNCs 
connected by reciprocal controlling shareholdings includes far more TNCs than 
any of the others. And there is the theory that TNCs exerting active control over 
each other will result in their attitudes and actions in relation to public policy 
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becoming more similar. To the extent that this occurs, the size of the core means 
that it is core attitudes that are likely to form the basis for any broad consensus on 
public policy among TNCs. To the extent that the attitudes of business 
organisations are aligned with a broad consensus of TNCs, which is what we 
would expect of representative organisations, they would therefore also be aligned 
with the attitudes of core TNCs. This would enhance the ability of core TNCs to 
influence public policy.  
But are the attitudes of business organisations in fact aligned with those of 
the core? Perhaps the theory is mistaken, or any homogenising effect is too weak 
to make a real difference to TNC attitudes.  
Although it is not possible to investigate this question directly, due to lack 
of data on the attitudes to public policy of TNCs and business organisations, it is 
possible to get an indirect indication of whether there is any such alignment.  
If the attitudes to public policy of representative organisations are aligned 
with those of core TNCs, we would expect the attitudes of these organisations to 
be more congenial to core TNCs and the TNCs they control than to other TNCs. 
For this reason we would expect a greater proportion of core and associated TNCs 
than other TNCs to join these organisations.  
The hypothesis to be tested is therefore that a significantly greater 
proportion of core and associated TNCs than other TNCs are members of relevant 
business organisations  
While confirmation of this hypothesis would not prove that core and 
business organisation attitudes are aligned, as the attitudes themselves are not 
observed, it would be what the centralisation theory leads us to expect. For this 
reason it would increase our confidence that this theory reflects reality even 
though it would not be conclusive. Disconfirmation would indicate that the theory 
needs to be amended or discarded.  
The proposition that core and associated TNCs are overrepresented in the 
memberships of representative organisations can be tested by comparing the 
membership in TNC-relevant business organisations of CORE and OUT TNCs, 
on the one hand, and IN and T&T TNCs, on the other. Although analysis of the 
findings of Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston has shown that they do not provide a 
completely accurate view of the topology of TNC ownership and active control, 
there is no indication that it is seriously misleading. Core TNCs and the TNCs 
they control can therefore be represented by CORE and OUT TNCs, while 
independent TNCs can be represented by IN and T&T TNCs.  
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The operational hypothesis is therefore that the proportion of CORE and 
OUT TNCs which are members of business organisations is significantly higher 
than the proportion of IN and T&T TNCs.   
This was tested by looking at the membership in business organisations of 
the set of 737 topholding TNCs that together control 80 percent of global TNC 
income. Of the 737 topholders, 176 are core in this broad sense (147 CORE plus 
29 OUT) while 561 are independent (342 IN plus 219 T&T). This means that core 
TNCs constitute 24 percent of topholders while independent TNCs constitute 76 
percent. If we remove state authorities, individuals, and families from the dataset, 
as we would not expect these to be members of business organisations, the 
proportion of core firms rises to 28 percent while the proportion of independent 
firms falls to 72 percent.  
It follows that if the proportion of core topholders (CORE plus OUT) who 
are members of a mainstream business organisation is the same as the proportion 
of independent topholders (OUT plus T&T) who are members - the null 
hypothesis - then on average we should expect about three independent topholders 
to be members for each core topholder. The specific hypothesis is therefore that 
the proportion of core topholders who are members of relevant business 
organisations is significantly higher than a third of the number of independent 
topholders who are members of the same organisations.  
Relevant business organisations can be divided into two main types. First, 
CEO clubs: the Business Roundtable and Financial Services Roundtable in the 
United States, and the European Roundtable and European Financial Services 
Roundtable in Europe. These are mainstream organisations in the sense that 
within their areas there are no rival CEO roundtables. Second, there are other 
establishment business organisations: the Institute of International Finance (IIF), 
the Bilderberg Conferences, the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the Trilateral 
Commission. Other business organisations that might seem to be relevant, such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, are disregarded because it is not clear that they are 
PDLQVWUHDP(PSOR\HUV¶IHGHUDWLRQVVXFKDV%XVLQHVV(XURSHDUHRPLWWHGEHFDXVH
TNC membership of these is indirect via industry and national federations. 
Table 1 shows that core topholders outnumber independent topholders 
among the members of these organisations by a considerable margin, as predicted. 
This is true not only for organisations with global reach but also for each of the 
distinctively American and European organisations.  
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Table 1. Core and independent topholder members of business organisations 
Business organisation Number of 
core/independent 
members 
Core members as a 
percentage of core plus 
independent members 
Business Roundtable 2012 11/2 85 
European Roundtable 2008 9/1 90 
Financial Services Roundtable 
2009 
26/7 79 
European Financial Services 
Roundtable 2012 
16/0 100 
Institute of International Finance 
(IIF)  members 2011 
45/6 88 
IIF Board 2011 14/2 88 
World Economic Forum (WEF) 
Industry Partners 2012 
41/16 80 
WEF  Strategic Partners 2012 24/4 86 
Bilderberg Steering Committee 
2012 
4/1 80 
Trilateral Commission 2012 50/3 94 
Core firms = CORE plus OUT firms. Independent firms = IN plus T&T firms.  
Core firms constitute 28 percent of the 737 topholder TNCs on which the calculations are based. 
Figures are for 2008 or 2009 where possible to match the time period with that covered by the 
study. The three results for samples big enough for significance tests were all significant at the 
0.001 level.34 
Sources: Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston, undated, Business Roundtable 2012, European Round 
Table of Industrialists 2012, Financial Services Roundtable 2012, European Financial Services 
Round Table 2011, Institute of International Finance 2012a, 2012b, World Economic Forum 
2012a, 2012b, Bilderberg 2012, Trilateral Commission 2012. 
 
The possibility that core TNCs are over-represented due to their size, or 
because they are disproportionately financial firms, was checked by re-running 
the test controlling for both sector and size. NACE codes were used to restrict the 
                                           
34
 Wessa 2012. 
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set of topholders to financial TNCs. Core and independent financial topholders 
were then matched according to the proportion of worldwide TNC operating 
revenue they control: each independent TNC was allocated a similarly sized core 
TNC until the eligible core TNCs (the ones similar in size to independent TNCs) 
ran out. The remaining unallocated independent TNCs were then removed from 
the dataset. Comparing the numbers of members of financial business 
organisations from the relevant matched sets reveals that core TNCs are still over-
represented even when size and sector are controlled.  
Taken together these results provide strong support for the hypothesis that a 
significantly higher proportion of CORE and OUT TNCs than IN and T&T TNCs 
are members of business organisations. The samples may be small, but core TNCs 
far outnumber independent TNCs in all of them. While these findings do not 
prove that the attitudes of business organisations are aligned with those of core 
TNCs, as we lack data on these attitudes, they are what we would expect if there 
is such an alignment: the theory that attitudes are aligned, and that therefore 
centralisation increases the capacity of core TNCs to influence public policy, 
passes this empirical test. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that there are good reasons to believe that the capacity of 
TNCs to influence public policy is greater than previously thought due to the 
discovery that TNC ownership and control is extremely concentrated and 
centralised. The high degree of concentration makes it easier for TNCs to agree 
on political action. The high degree of centralisation makes the attitudes of core 
TNCs, and by extension TNCs in general, more similar than they otherwise would 
be. The results of analysing the membership of business organisations provide 
support for the idea that they are dominated by a core of interconnected TNCs in 
the sense that the attitudes to public policy of these organisations are aligned with 
those of core TNCs. 
The obvious next step in this line of research would be to replicate the study 
by Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston in order to find out how the patterns of TNC 
ownership and control have changed since 2007, with particular reference to the 
financial crisis of 2008. Do we see the same concentration and core-periphery 
structure? How does the picture change if only shareholdings above a certain level 
are deemed to translate into control? Further investigation could also shed light on 
broader issues such as the nature of transnational elites and the extent to which it 
is meaningful to speak of the emergence of a transnational capitalist class.35 The 
underlying theory that concentration increases influence on public policy could be 
tested further by investigating whether industrial sectors with high concentration 
                                           
35
 See, for example, Sklair 2001; Carroll 2010. 
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of ownership and control are also the sectors with the most business-friendly 
government policies.  
A further possibility would be to investigate why financial institutions are 
much more prominent in the network of global corporate control than they are in 
networks of firms connected by transnational board interlocks.36 It is not 
surprising that financial institutions own a lot of shares: industrial firms issue 
shares in order to raise money to invest in production while financial institutions 
invest in the shares of industrial firms in order to make money from dividends and 
movements in the prices of shares. They also invest in shares issued by each other 
and thereby become involved in networks of cross-ownership. As globalisation 
progresses, at some point the increasing number of transnational shareholdings 
must start to form transnational networks of cross-ownership that eventually 
merge into a single global network of cross-holdings dominated by financial 
institutions. The issue is why financial institutions are not also heavily involved in 
transnational board interlocks given that representation on the boards of owned 
firms is one of the main ways in which controlling shareholders can exercise their 
power. The obvious explanation is that they prefer to exercise power through 
implicit or explicit threats to sell their shares when a firm displeases them, but this 
remains to be confirmed. 
Finally, it would be worth comparing the actual attitudes to public policy of 
business organisations and CORE TNCs in order to test directly the extent to 
which these are aligned. The test reported in the previous section provides some 
support for this view but does not prove it to be true. The main difficulty would be 
in obtaining accurate data on the attitudes of core TNCs and business 
organisations. 
The degree to which TNCs are concentrated and centralised was not 
anticipated. The implication that this increases their capacity to influence public 
policy is good news for business but bad news for politicians, officials and voters. 
 
  
                                           
36
 Nollert 2005: 298; Heemskerk 2013; Carroll 2010: 226. 
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